In 1999 and 2000, John McCain Agreed With Obama on Pakistan and Democracy

Sen. Barack Obama last night:

Here’s what I said, and if John wants to disagree with this, he can let me know, that if the United States has al Qaeda, bin Laden, top-level lieutenants in our sights, and Pakistan is unable or unwilling to act, then we should take them out.

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Now, Senator McCain is also right that it’s difficult. This is not an easy situation.

You’ve got cross-border attacks against U.S. troops, and we’ve got a choice. We could allow our troops to just be on the defensive and absorb those blows again and again and again if Pakistan is unwilling to cooperate, or we have to start making some decisions.

And the problem, John, with — with the strategy that’s been pursued was that for 10 years we coddled Musharraf; we alienated the Pakistani population because we were anti-democratic; we had a 20th century mind-set that basically said, well, you know, he may be a dictator, but he’s our dictator; and as a consequence, we lost legitimacy in Pakistan. We spent $10 billion. And in the meantime, they weren’t going after al Qaeda, and they are more powerful now than any time since we began the war in Afghanistan. That’s going to change when I’m president of the United States.

Sen. John McCain last night:

I don’t think that Senator Obama understands that there was a failed state in Pakistan when Musharraf came to power. Everybody who was around then and had been there and knew about it knew that it was a failed state.

The Union Leader, January 29, 2000 (Lexis):

McCain criticized the praise that followed last year’s military takeover in Pakistan, saying change should occur from within, not by force.

In remarks on October 18, 1999, John McCain did not indicate that Pakistan was a failed state, and highlighted the importance of democracy (Lexis):

North Korea was busy building nuclear weapons even though it was a signatory to the Nonproliferation Treaty. Other nuclear states — Pakistan and India — have not signed the CTBT and can also be expected to act in what their leaders perceive is their national interest.

The administration was caught flat-footed when India tested, but it strongly warned Pakistan not to follow suit, to no avail.

Equally absurd is to suggest that the most recent military coup in Pakistan is an example that things might happen in the absence of Senate ratification of an arms control agreement. The military has ruled Pakistan for half its history.

As the world’s leading democracy, we should support the restoration of civilian rule in Pakistan, but we should not automatically assume that the new regime will engage in nuclear brinksmanship with India. And the idea that the CTBT would have somehow affected tensions in the subcontinent is laughable. We surely have an interest in helping prevent a fourth Indian-Pakistani war. It is conceivable that such a war could go nuclear. The CTBT would have done precisely nothing to prevent that.

We should, as we have only in recent months, encourage a relaxation of tensions, especially with regard to the Kashmir flashpoint. The administration ignored this problem until India and Pakistan tested.

And as we urge the early restoration of democracy in Pakistan, we should do what we can to ensure the current military regime be moderate in its approach to its neighbor. First indications are that it might be more moderate than its democratic predecessor. Already, they have announced troop pullbacks from the border.

We should not isolate Pakistan, but encourage it to be pro- Western and reject Iran-style fundamentalism or Afghani chaos. Let’s not repeat the mistake of imposing the same kind of counterproductive sanctions we did after Pakistan tested.